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Lynda E. Boose 
Crossing the River Drina: Bosnian Rape Camps, Turkish 
Impalement, and Serb Cultural Memory 
n February 22, 2001, at the trial of three indicted war criminals from 
Foca, the Hague International War Crimes Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) concluded for the first time that rape and sexual enslavement 
were violations of sufficient gravity to be considered as "crimes against 
humanity" under international law. This overdue move to place sexual 
crimes on the list of most serious crimes for prosecution came in the wake 
of the international outrage generated by the Bosnian war, where the mass 
rape and forced incarceration of women in so-called rape camps had been 
one of the chief strategies used by Serbian forces primarily against the 
Muslim populations of both Bosnia and Kosovo. Thus, in what the As- 
sociated Press described as "wrenching, horrific testimony" (Associated 
Press quoted in Gartenberg 2000), those Bosnian women courageous 
enough to testify became symbolic speakers for the many thousands of 
women who did not appear, either because they had been killed after 
being raped, or because their rapists remained unapprehended, or because 
they remained silent for fear of being ostracized within their own culture. 
Conservative estimates of the number of women raped during the Bos- 
nian war run between twenty thousand and fifty thousand; what happened 
in the rape camps of Bosnia includes a list of atrocities as endless as the 
sadistic imagination might devise.' Throughout 1992 and 1993, truck- 
I owe a special note of thanks to Nermina Zildzo, Nenad Filipovic, and Drazan Lapic 
for sharing insights into their culture with me and to Annabelle Winograd for her invaluable 
help in commenting on the manuscript. 
1 The two books that have become the standard references for documented information 
about rape and the Bosnian war are Stiglmayer 1994 and Allen 1996. A lesser-known but 
excellent account, published in English, comes from Montenegrin journalist Seada Vranic 
(1996), whose work includes the perspective of Bosnian psychologists as well as the voices 
of rape victims. Additionally, see Bernard 1994; Ramet 1999; and Drakulic 2000. Recently 
made available is the English translation of a text originally published in Belgrade; Vesna 
Nkolic-Ristanovic's collection of essays ([1995] 2000) written by four women all from the 
present Yugoslavia (the Serbian-controlled remnant of the former federal Yugoslavia) offers 
a variant perspective on the Bosnian war and its particular violence against women. By its 
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loads of eastern Bosnia's Muslim women arrived in the central cities of 
Travnik, Zenica, and Visoko, and from there they were taken in busloads 
to the nearest hospital for abortions. Speaking of the likelihood of psy- 
chological rehabilitation for the rape victims of this war, Bosnian psychi- 
atrist Muradis Kulenovic makes the point that even the terms by which 
psychology understands the word rape are rendered grossly insufficient if 
not meaningless by the experience of large numbers of Bosniak women,2 
for whom rape commonly occurred within an interlinked sequence of 
traumatic events in which, Kulenovic says, "the victim, prior to the rape, 
had experienced the massacre of children and parents, then had to watch 
the murder of her husband, who had been forced to watch the rape of 
his wife. Finally,. . . terrified and probably naked, she had to flee under 
a rain of bullets from her burning village, stumbling on the mangled and 
charred bodies of her relatives, neighbors and friends" (quoted in Vranic 
1996, 194). Under such circumstances, the term rape exceeds any context 
in which traditional forms of therapy can assume its meaning. 
While several decades of feminist pressure have brought at least some 
change in the view of rape within North American and western European 
societies, in most other cultures the way that rape is socially constructed 
makes it primarily a violation defiling the male members of both the 
victim's family and her community, and thus the narrative of the raped 
woman has always been a text that is simply disallowed from the culture's 
self-story.3 Yet while this very reaction hands the invader a useful weapon 
attempt to hide an evident Serbian nationalism under the guise of feminism, however, and 
by its insistence throughout on a purportedly apolitical stance that wants us to read the 
violence of the Bosnian war as equally suffered and enacted by all three ethnic groups, the 
book exposes its unacknowledged participation in that particular discourse that seeks to 
minimize the enormity of Serb responsibility by redistributing responsibility to those who 
were disproportionately the war's real victims-the Bosnian Muslims. Ironically enough, by 
implicitly invoking such claims, the book seizes on the same strategy that the United States 
adopted during the Bosnian war as a means of glossing over the reality ofvictim and victimizer 
and rationalizing its own decision to avoid military intervention in a war that the U.S. military 
hierarchy balked at entering. 
2 Bosniak is the Balkan term for Bosnians who are Muslim. 
3 Only a deeply entrenched patriarchalism can explain the story of a Kosovar Albanian 
family's reaction to the rape of their thirteen-year-old daughter, Pranvera, who was among 
the twenty young girls raped by Serb troops who ethnically cleansed her Kosovar village in 
1999 and forced the Albanians to flee in exile across the border. While for four days and 
nights Pranvera was held in the basement and gang-raped, her family upstairs was held at 
gunpoint and forced to listen helplessly to her screams. The battered little girl was eventually 
returned to her family, but unlike the other family members, she never reached the relative 
safety of the Kukes camp. Before reaching the border, this deeply loved daughter was sac- 
rificially sent by her father to join the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) guerrilla forces, where 
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for destroying the invaded community and may in fact encourage him to 
rape, even that consequence is apparently deemed preferable to the fem- 
inization of the community body implicit in the acceptance of either the 
violated woman or the story for which her body is text. As a vivid illus- 
tration of how resistant cultural narratives can prove when faced with such 
undesirable histories, it is telling to note that it is only now, more than a 
half century after the fact, that the national narratives of India and Paki- 
stan are reluctantly allowing any space at all for the suppressed stories of 
the mass violation of Muslim and Hindu women that took place during 
Partition.4 Likewise, only recently have the equally unwelcome stories of 
the sexual enslavement that Korean, New Guinean, and other so-called 
comfort women suffered at the hands of the Japanese army during World 
War II finally surfaced.5 Culture has authorized only one narrative for a 
woman raped by the enemy-the one of the Roman, Lucrece, that con- 
cludes with her suicide. In postwar Sarajevo, as some forty Bosnian women 
survivors banded together to publish their testimonies and thereby force 
them into public consciousness, the bravery of the survivors ran nearly at 
cross purposes to the apologetic defensiveness implicit in the title they 
gave their book, I Begged Them to Kill Me (Association of Camp In- 
mates-Canton Sarajevo [2000]; described in Drakulic 2001).6 Such am- 
bivalence itself speaks volumes about the coercive interplay of gender and 
cultural memory. 
The rape camps of the Bosnian war have been documented as a sys- 
tematically planned Serb instrument of genocide designed not merely to 
encourage the evacuation of all non-Serbs but to destroy parent-child and 
spousal bonds and render large numbers of the society's child-bearing 
women contaminated and thus unmarriageable. As a strategic tool of 
"ethnic cleansing," rape was, moreover, part of a long-range goal to un- 
dermine the ethnic mixing that had been openly encouraged in Tito's 
the family fully expected her to be killed. For the parents, their daughter's life was essentially 
over at the moment of her rape; and thus sending her where she might at least seek revenge 
against her attackers and possibly redeem her family's (read father's) honor in death was a 
fully responsible way of caring for her. See Williams 1999. 
4 For what happened on a mass scale to both Hindu and Muslim women during Partition, 
see especially Butalia (1998) 2000. 
5 The first book to expose the story of the "comfort women" was Hicks 1995. Subse- 
quently, the women began to speak for themselves. See Schellstede 2000; Stetz 2000; and 
Yoshimi 2000. 
6 This women's organization, which has self-published its members' stories, calls itself 
the Association of Camp Inmates-Canton Sarajevo, and it lists a telephone and fax number 
in Bosnia at (011) 387-71-232925. The information about this source comes from Drakulic 
2001. 
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Yugoslavia, where intermarriage had become increasingly common and 
people had really begun to see themselves as "Yugoslavs" rather than Serbs, 
Croatians, Macedonians, and so forth. Hence, the Serb army, apparently 
acting on orders, frequently forced Bosnian Serbs not just to witness the 
rape and murder of their Muslim neighbors but to participate in such acts 
themselves, thereby coercing Bosnia's Serbs into a complicity with Bel- 
grade that lessened both the ability of the different groups to live together 
in the future and the likelihood that any Bosnian Serb observers would 
ever report the war crimes they may have witnessed being committed. 
Rape became, in essence, a particularly effective tool for perpetrating the 
kind of trauma that Kai Erikson defines as collective in its ability to inflict 
"a blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds attaching 
people together and impairs the prevailing sense of communality" (1995, 
103). 
Yet while this explanation of mass rape and the other atrocities of the 
Yugoslav wars is critical for recognizing the planned brutality of those 
conflicts, it seems nonetheless too rational and arid to fully account for 
the enormity of what happened in Bosnia. And although increasing the 
numbers of a putatively threatened Serb population (or at least motivating 
Serb men to see their actions as procreatively beneficial to the Serb nation) 
may likewise have played some role in the mass rape of Bosniak women, 
there were far too many women killed immediately after being raped or 
killed after becoming too debilitated to serve their purpose in a rape camp 
for the production of Serb babies to work as a likely rationale. In the 
Bosnian war, mass killing was up close, savagely personal, and typically 
conducted in a hands-on orgy of bloodletting. Muslims were butchered 
by their former Serb friends and neighbors, and murder was randomly 
committed by almost anyone designated "Serb"-the remnant Yugoslav 
army, controlled by Slobodan Milosevic out of Belgrade and now in effect 
the Serbian army; the Bosnian Serb army controlled by Radovan Karadzic 
out of Bosnia; paramilitary volunteers from Serbia or Bosnia; local police; 
and longtime neighbors. Against the organized, dispassionate, bureaucra- 
tized logic that is the horrific signifier of Nazi-orchestrated genocide, the 
savagery perpetrated in places like Foca, Manjaca, or Camp Omarska reeks 
of another kind of brutality: uncontrolled, spontaneous, blood-fixated, and 
so remarkably adolescent as to suggest the existence of some unconscious 
script being played out alongside the canonical one of genocide as a strat- 
egy for territorial acquisition. In an orgy of nationalism bathed in alcohol, 
athletic contests, and Serbian songs, Serb soldiers threw Muslims off of 
cliffs and from hotel roofs into rivers, carved Orthodox crosses into their 
S I G N S Autumn 2002 I 75 
chests, hacked off the arms or legs of their victims, made women clean 
up the mess from such amputations, and then raped the women on top 
of the blood-soaked rags.7 Even the sheer expenditure of energy required 
by all this butchery overwhelms the antiseptic rationality of "ethnic cleans- 
ing." Suddenly, Dr. Strangelove's arm jerks up. And suddenly, the psychic 
space from which this violence emanates becomes recognizable as the space 
of Serbian epic culture, the dark storehouse of Serbian cultural memory 
that, in the wake of Tito's death, became a source for cynical politicians 
looking for alternative populist myths to displace the "Brotherhood of 
Yugoslavs" ideal through which Tito had reigned supreme for forty-five 
years. 
Serbian nationalist mythology 
Everything about the Yugoslav golgotha suggests that it was written out 
of a revived and newly politicized lethal combination of nationalist myth, 
Christoslavic typology, and, to a far lesser extent, documentable history. 
The scripts that Serb soldiers typically enacted in rape camps are instruc- 
tive. According to frequently echoed testimony from female survivors, as 
the usually drunken, enraged soldiers raped and beat them, the rapists 
screamed either "Turkish whore" or "Ustashe whore" at their victims, 
triumphantly jeering after reaching orgasm that the woman was now car- 
rying "Serb seed" and would produce a "Serb baby." In these assertions, 
what floods in is not some credible explanation for the prevalence of rape 
but the fundamental irrationality that defines the chief cultural fiction of 
the Balkans: the fiction of difference. 
What made the Bosnian war incomprehensible to most Americans was 
that, while it was clear that ethnic difference-or at least the perception 
of it-was a crucial issue, the obvious lack of a parallel basis of comparison 
among "Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims" and what to do with "Bos- 
nian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Croatian Serbs, Croatian Muslims, Serbian 
Croats, Serbian Muslims" made the war impossible to sort out. Moreover, 
the only explanation possible is one that begs its own question, and that 
is that in the Balkans-and especially in Serbia-a type of racial ethnicity 
is largely assumed to be synonymous with religious difference, and ethnic 
identity synonymous with national boundaries. Thus Serbs denotes all 
7 This experience is depicted in Mandy Jacobson and Karmen Jelincic's searing docu- 
mentary film, Calling the Ghosts (1996), which follows the experience of two women held 
in Camp Omarska. 
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those who belong to the Orthodox faith, regardless of whether or not 
they or their ancestors ever set foot inside Serbia proper.8 But, because 
ethnic identity is assumed to be synonymous with national boundaries 
and those calling themselves Serbs presume hereditary connections to 
Serbia just as Croats (Roman Catholics) do to Croatia, when Bosnia de- 
clared its independence from the Yugoslav federation, those "Serbs" living 
in Bosnia-working fist in mail with the Belgrade government-began 
loudly to claim discrimination and demand that the areas they lived in be 
united with Serbia. And since "Serbs" were scattered all over Bosnia and 
living cheek by jowl with or indeed married to Muslims or Croats, Serbia 
began laying claim, village by village, to most of Bosnia. Underlying all this 
confusion is the monumental tragic irony of the Balkans: in reality, all three 
of these peoples actually belong to exactly the same racial and linguistic 
group, southern Slavs. Logically speaking, the only difference among them 
is a strictly religious one, and a "Serb baby" would be indistinguishable 
from a "Bosnian Muslim" one. 
But Serbian epic culture depends on the radical denial of precisely that 
connection. When taken to the extremes of collective cultural denial, the 
vision of the nation/self as involved in an ongoing epic struggle to retain 
its heroic uniqueness-inevitably constructed around fantasies of racial 
purity-is what allows a people to reach such euphoric heights of na- 
tionalist paranoia that it can imagine it necessary to "ethnically cleanse" 
a land of its "others" when the others are, in reality, ancestrally identical 
to the cleansers. 
In ways that laid the groundwork for the blood orgies of the 1990s, 
Serb national mythology has always constructed the Slavic conversion to 
Christianity that occurred sometime after their sixth-century arrival in the 
Balkans as unimpeachably valid. But the conversion of Slavs to Islam that 
occurred after the late fourteenth-century Ottoman invasion is conversely 
construed as a "race betrayal" that had the effect of literally transforming 
those Slavs who converted to Islam into "Turks." In Kosovo, the Kosovar 
Albanians are apparently descended (inconveniently) from the first people 
to move into the Balkans, the Illyrians, who arrived in the area in about 
8 B.C.E. Because such a history works out badly in terms of primary 
claims, however, an entire scientific/academic/political enterprise is hard 
at work in Serbia trying to establish that Albanians are not the descendents 
of Illyrians but come from a mixture of various remnant groups whose 
8 Orthodoxy is defined in this area of the Balkans by the Serbian Orthodox Church, just 
as it is defined farther south by the Greek Orthodox and farther east by the Russian Orthodox 
authority. 
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arrival dates to the seventeenth century, well after that of the Serbs (Vickers 
1998, 1-3). Yet while it seems clear that the Albanian Kosovars are neither 
Turks nor Slavic converts guilty of race betrayal, within the Serb vocabulary 
the mostly Muslim Albanian majority in Kosovo (or Kosovars) can become 
"Turks" almost as readily as can the Bosnian Muslims.9 As Kosovo with 
its 90 percent Albanian majority became an increasingly political issue in 
the late 1980s, "I'll be first, who'll be second to drink some Turkish 
blood?" became a common slogan in Serbia (Cigar 1996, 57). 
The sense of the irrational clings as well to the geography of the war 
and the disproportionate fury that the breakup of the former Yugoslavia 
unleashed against the Muslims. When the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, 
and then Bosnia-already concerned by the mid-1980s about rising Serb 
nationalism-withdrew from the federation they saw as devolving into 
"Serboslavia," the logic of pre-Tito history should have made Croatia the 
more likely target of Serb rage. In the Croatian Ustashe death camps of 
World War II, between sixty thousand and eight hundred thousand Serbs 
were massacred in a systematic, clear attempt at genocide. The Serbs thus 
had real, tangible, and unassuaged grievances against Croatia that had been 
rigorously suppressed under Tito but had remained vivid within collective 
memory. 
Yet it was Bosnia, not Croatia, that bore the brunt of Serbian rage, 
and the pattern of the war maps out that displacement. Serb fury initially 
erupted in July of 1991 with an invasion of Croatia, where, in a display 
of awesome violence, Serb troops relentlessly leveled the defenseless city 
of Vukovar.'1 But although the Croatians could at that point offer no 
serious resistance, the Serb army, after a rather desultory shelling of Za- 
greb, made a sudden, unexpected U-turn, crossed back over the river, 
and for nearly four years vented its fury on the hapless Bosnians. It was 
not that memories of the Ustashe were dead or that the Serbs felt avenged 
for the very real victimization they had suffered at Croatian hands: the 
widespread use of Ustashe as the most pejorative term possible reflects this 
still-potent anger. But in ways disjunct enough to suggest once again a 
dangerous displacement at work, the epithet Ustashe was used as often 
against Bosnian Muslims as against Croats, and the illogical reference to 
9 Because the use of the name Kosovo (used by Serbians) or Kosova (used by Albanians) 
can be read as a political statement, I need to clarify that my choice of the "o" spelling is 
based entirely on its greater recognizability to English-speaking readers. 
10 Although the Jugoslav National Army (JNA) was what this army still called itself, 
Yugoslavia by now consisted of only Serbia and a co-opted Montenegro, and thus referring 
to it as a Serb army seems justified, as it was now working at Slobodan Milosevic's behest 
to carve out a greater Serbia. 
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Jasenovac, the most notorious of the Croatian Ustashe death camps, came 
up frequently as a justifying rationale for concentration camps holding 
Muslims and for the Serb massacre of Muslims at Srebrenica (Vulliamy 
1996)." 
The vignette that New York Times European Editor Roger Cohen offers 
of a bus ride across the River Drina during the Bosnian war provides a 
snapshot of how the past was playing out in Serb popular memory. At 
each stop from Belgrade into Bosnia, a handful of Serb males boarded 
the bus, grenades and Kalashnikov rifles in hand, some of them sporting 
bits of their grandfathers' World War II Chetnik uniforms and others in 
getups that signified the rival Partisans, and all resembling, says Cohen, 
something more like a historical dress-up party than any kind of disciplined 
army. Singing Serb nationalist songs and drinking slivovitz in bleary toasts, 
this ragtag bunch of weekend killers raucously crossed the Drina, to debark 
in some Bosnian town and spend the day killing "Turks" (Cohen 1998, 
125-27).12 
What surfaces in this picture and elsewhere is the figure of the Turk 
at the center of Serb cultural memory, where, infuriatingly, he threatens 
to conquer, victimize, feminize, and humiliate Serb national selfhood (al- 
ways a masculine construct) and infantilize all Serbia's attempts to achieve 
independent adulthood. Given Serbia's history of five hundred years of 
Ottoman domination, the entrenchment of this figure should not be sur- 
prising, especially since the Turk also haunts the earlier literature of many 
European countries that never experienced Turkish occupation. For Ser- 
bia-which has never forgotten and thus has never gotten over the 
Turk-he remains an ever-internalized figure of occupation that must 
11 Ed Vulliamy, the British journalist who was responsible for locating and uncovering 
Camp Omarska in 1992, went back to Bosnia in 1996 and again interviewed Milan Kovacevic, 
the man who in 1992 had been the camp administrator. In a remarkably revealing interview, 
Kovacevic begins his rationalization of Omarska by talking about his own childhood spent 
in Jasenovac. When Vulliamy interjects, "But Jasenovac was run by Croats; why did the Serbs 
turn on the Muslims?" Kovacevic mutters, "There is a direct connection between what 
happened to the Muslims in our camps and the fact that there had been some Muslim soldiers 
in the [pro-Nazi] Greater Croatia" (Vulliamy 1996, 13). In Vulliamy's analysis, "What the 
Serbs have done is to project their own obsessive 'racial memory' onto their perceived 
enemies. The Serbs' inimitable cult of the victim demanded that they create victims. Their 
experience of concentration camps demanded that they create concentration camps" (14). 
In terms of the argument of this article, I would add that their (perceived) experience of 
rape likewise demanded that they rape. 
12 Cohen, too, notes the peculiarly adolescent, recreational aspects to the atrocities com- 
mitted by the Serb militia. One paramilitary unit, active in the Brcko area, was called the 
"Weekenders"; another, active in Prijedor, called itself the "Rambos." 
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always be reconfronted, despite the fact of Turkish withdrawal from the 
Balkans nearly a century ago. The consequences of this Turkish occupation 
of the Serb imaginary are evident in the statement that General Ratko 
Mladic made over Serb television from the conquered town of Srebrenica, 
the supposed "UN safe haven," which UN troop withdrawal essentially 
abandoned to the Serb army. In the background, as the camera picks up 
a column of captive Muslim men being led, as we now know, off to their 
mass execution, Mladic memorializes the day to his Belgrade audience by 
saying, "Here we are in Srebrenica on July 11, 1995. On the eve of yet 
another great Serb holiday. We present this city to the Serbian people as 
a gift. Finally, the time has come to take revenge on the Turks" (Stover 
1998, 88-89).13 
The internal entrenchment of this fantasized, ever-present Turkish con- 
queror began, ironically enough, simultaneously with the production of 
a Serb epic culture dedicated to the construction of a glorious Serbian 
past that itself began almost immediately after the defeat of the Serbs at 
the Battle of Kosovo Polje on June 28, 1389, a day that the Orthodox 
calendar now commemoratively marks as St. Vitus's Day. Among the states 
that once formed Yugoslavia, Serbia is the one that can boast of a literary 
tradition that is both truly epic and so genuinely alive on the popular level 
that its songs and legends are not just known by everyone in Serbia but 
sung, as well, all over the former Yugoslavia. In the midst of it all is the 
central narrative of Serbian national selfhood: defeat by the Turk at the 
Battle of Kosovo and a heroic masculinity kept alive by Serbia's implacable 
determination to avenge its captivity. In 1989, with Tito eight years dead, 
the Soviet Union breaking up, the ideology of communism that had gov- 
erned for the past half century faltering, and nationalism on the rise, a 
calamitous trick of history brought around the six-hundred-year anniver- 
sary of the Kosovo defeat, and that coincidence provided Slobodan Mil- 
osevic and other ethnofascist politicians the fortuitous opportunity to 
convert this Kosovo baggage into an unimpeachable rallying site for pu- 
tative Serb victimization. The commemorative ceremonies that Milosevic 
orchestrated for media broadcast have been described as having "all the 
trappings of a coronation staged as a Hollywood extravaganza" (Milan 
Milosevic 2000, 109). Apparently taking a note from Hitler's famous 
descent into Nuremberg (and Leni Riefenstahl's infamous recording of 
that event in Triumph of the Will [1935]), Milosevic "descended by heli- 
copter from the heavens into the cheering crowd, the masses were the 
'3 Mladic's words are quoted in English translation alongside stills from this television 
broadcast in Stover 1998. 
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extras. The cameras focused on his arrival. In some vague way, the com- 
mentator placed Milosevic at the center of the Serbian ancestral myth of 
Prince Lazar, the hero and martyr of the Kosovo battle" (Milan Milosevic 
2000, 130). On this date, within a carefully staged television spectacular 
and standing on the sanctified locus of a Serb nationalism being vividly 
constructed, Milosevic "for the first time explicitly mentioned the pos- 
sibility of war" (Milan Milosevic 2000, 121). A month or so prior to the 
broadcast from Kosovo, to revivify the aggressions built into the cultural 
memory of the Kosovo defeat and imbue them with an immediacy, Mi- 
losevic and associates carted the six-hundred-year-old body of Prince La- 
zar, the Serb leader defeated at Kosovo Polje, through every Serb village 
and town, where crowds of villagers, dressed in black, turned out to mourn 
him. It was a stunningly effective tactic. For, as Vamik Volkan notes, "Serbs 
began to feel as if the defeat at Kosovo Polje had occurred only recently, 
a development made possible by the fact that the chosen trauma had been 
kept effectively alive-although sometimes dormant-for centuries" 
([1997] 1998, 67). It was, says Volkan, as if "the psychological DNA of 
Kosovo continued to be passed down from one generation to the next, 
. . 
.[and] Milosevic's focus on Kosovo reactivated this DNA" ([1997] 
1998, 67-68). 
Not many nations celebrate a defeat as the cradle of their nationhood, 
but by doing so Serbs seal their history within a mythic imaginary in 
which the Serbs are forever victims, situated for perpetuity in the place 
of resentment and unassuaged revenge within a story that promises to 
confer heroism in the present only through return, repetition, and re- 
venge. Yet, in terms of historical reality, the Battle of Kosovo became 
the Serbs' defining myth only during the nineteenth century, when, in 
the midst of one of the more successful Serb rebellions, the oral poetic 
tradition was reshaped with a vastly enhanced, quasi-religious script and 
finally written down by Vuk Karadzhich, who is credited with preser- 
vation of this oral tradition. While Karadzhich's role as a committed 
participant in the Serb cause undoubtedly influenced the transmission, 
the transcribed Kosovo legends that collectively make up the "Kosovo 
Cycle" include, in a way characteristic of epic literature, a number of 
historical contradictions that offer a repressed counternarrative to the 
story they are intended to tell. And such contradictions create at least 
the possibility of telling the story another way. The binary of Serb versus 
Turk that is traditionally understood as the ideological grand narrative 
of the Kosovo Cycle, for instance, suppresses a number of qualifying or 
even contradictory details that the stories themselves contain-details 
such as the fact that in 1389 there were a number of Serbs fighting on 
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the side of the Turks; that the Albanians were allies who fought with 
the Serbs in this battle; that Turks and Serbs frequently changed sides 
and frequently intermarried; and that the "blood" defining the ethnic 
selfhood of most modern Serbs is almost certainly itself the product of 
such Serb/Turk unions. 
In the official reading of the meaning of the Battle of Kosovo that 
forms the core of nationalist memory, the Serb leader Prince Lazar be- 
comes a type of Christ whose people fall into servitude for the five hundred 
years after he is killed by the Muslim Turks. Needing a Judas figure to 
go with Lazar's Last Supper as well as to account for Lazar's defeat, the 
story situates one of Lazar's commanders, Vuk Brankovic, in the role of 
traitor. And though historians unanimously argue that Brankovic has been 
unjustly maligned, he is far too useful to the narrative for his virtue to be 
reclaimed. As the traitor within, he becomes a figure for those Slavs who 
converted to Islam-Vuk Brankovic is, in other words, the Bosnian Mus- 
lims. Out of these various archetypal connections developed the convo- 
luted logic that was repeatedly voiced as Serb soldiers murdered Muslims 
and plundered their way across Bosnia. In killing Muslims, even ones who 
are Slavic brethren, the Serb aggressor sees himself as defender of Christian 
Europe: he is cleansing Europe of the infidel Turks and, by doing so, 
avenging his savior's death. For through this conflation of myth and his- 
tory within the cultural imaginary, not only do all Muslims become 
"Turks," but through a logic built on an otherwise incomprehensible 
anachronism, the Muslims (not the Jews) become those who, in killing 
Lazar, killed Christ. Thus, the Bosnian Muslims are not only "Turk race 
traitors" but "Muslim Christ-killers," despite the fact that neither Mu- 
hammad nor Islam came into being until seven hundred years after the 
death of Jesus.'4 As stand-ins for the "Turk," the Bosnian Muslims became 
targets for a violence that played out the deep-seated fear of the Turk and 
the five-hundred-year subjugation of Serbian independence through which 
that figure is remembered. 
Impalement and crucifixion 
There is, moreover, a particular reason why rape should have become 
unconsciously the most appropriate form for Serb revenge, and it coheres 
with yet another image that seems as deeply ingrained in the Serb imag- 
inary as is the figure of the Turk: the image of the Turkish practice of 
impalement. 
14 For elaboration, see especially Sells 1996b. 
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Within Serb cultural memory it is historical truth that the Turks impaled 
Serb vassals. So prevalent is the belief, in fact, that a number of well- 
reputed analysts of the Yugoslav wars assume that impalement happened 
frequently. Slaven Letica notes the "Ottoman Turkish practice of impaling 
Serbs and Christians on stakes" and says, without listing specific examples, 
that "entire portions of the mythical, cultural, and national traditions and 
of popular aesthetics (national ballads) involve the motif of 'impalement 
on a stake"' (1996, 95). Julie Mertus, though more cautious in locating 
the impalement story as a part of nationalist literature rather than historical 
fact, likewise asserts that "every Serbian school child knows about the 
horror of impalement from national folk ballads, national novels, national 
plays and other national traditions" (1999, 109).15 Yet there is no mention 
of such a practice in any part of the Kosovo Cycle, and the single source 
actually cited by either author is the unforgettable image from Nobel 
Prize-winner Ivo Andric's 1945 novel, The Bridge on the Drina ([1945] 
1959), a fictionalized narrative of the sixteenth-century construction of 
the Turkish bridge at Visegrad in which a Serb peasant hero manages 
temporarily to halt the building efforts before being caught and publicly 
impaled on the bridge to die an excruciating death. However, according 
to Nenad Filipovic, the famous scene in Andric not only is entirely fictional 
but is itself the only instance in Serbian literature where Turkish impale- 
ment of a Serb occurs. While impalement was indeed practiced by the 
Turks, its use was reserved exclusively for traitorous members of their own 
officer corps. For Filipovic, The Bridge on the Drina-a required school 
text that was read by every child in the former Yugoslavia-is the source 
responsible for the belief now widely held across the Balkans in the actual 
historicity of such a practice.16 
Despite the ahistoricity of the impalement story, it became unques- 
tioned in Serb collective memory because cultural memory, as Raphael 
Samuel notes, "far from being merely a passive receptacle or storage 
system, an image bank of the past, is rather an active, shaping force . 
is dynamic" (1994, x). As such, it is frequently impervious to histori- 
15 Mertus's otherwise excellent study is, overall, a testimony of her knowledge of the 
Balkans and her skill in reading its cultural politics. 
16 The information from Filipovic, a Bosniak in Turkish Studies at Princeton University, 
is from private correspondence, 2001. Not only in the Balkans but in cultural imagination 
across Europe, impalement exists as a particular sign of Turkish depravity despite evidence 
that it was practiced in at least Austria and Hungary as well. Its most famous practitioner 
was a fifteenth-century Romanian prince from Wallachia called Vlad the Impaler, later re- 
written in western European narrative as Dracula. 
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cal facticity. Pure fictions that merely seem right because they enhance 
the dynamics of a national myth may be readily appropriated into it and 
acquire a greater perceived historical truth than any factually historical 
events that would, conversely, seem to threaten it. In the Serb psyche, 
impalement thus remains so vivid an experience and one that so thor- 
oughly justifies any act of revenge that, according to Michael Sells, im- 
palement was explicitly invoked by Bosnian Serb leaders "to justify the 
attacks on Bosnian Muslims who are alleged to be Turks because of the 
conversion of their ancestors to Islam" (1996b, 39). The illogic of the 
connection is stunning. That Bosnian Muslims should be killed because 
their ancestors converted to Islam and because Turks who practiced 
Islam had, several centuries ago, supposedly impaled Serbs who may 
have been ancestors of Serbs now living in Bosnia-this requires such 
an enormous stretch of logic that the very fact of its invocation is telling. 
Yet despite the dubious historicity of the impalement story, Andric's 
appropriation of this particular form of violence so effectively guaranteed 
its continued life in Serb memory that John Matthias, translator of the 
Kosovo Cycle, comments that, for Serbs, Andric's scene became the 
"most resonant single image . .. of the suffering endured by the Chris- 
tian Slavic population during the long night of Turkish rule in the Bal- 
kans" (1987, 14). During the Bosnian war, in a frenzy of violence seem- 
ingly designed to avenge the event to which Andric's scene had given 
reality, Serb units turned the bridge at Visegrad into a killing center 
from which they hurled Muslims to their deaths below. Moreover, al- 
though the Serbs thundered through Bosnia destroying every monu- 
ment, mosque, gravestone, bridge, edifice, or sign of the Turkish oc- 
cupation, in a gesture of appreciation for Andric's empathetic depiction 
of the Serb story, the one Turkish sign they left standing was the bridge 
over the Drina at Visegrad-thus ironically rememorializing the scene 
of Serb subjection to Turk impalement. 
Andric's scene on the bridge contains, as Sells describes it, "a long, 
anatomically detailed account of the death of the heroic Serb, with explicit 
evocations of the crucifixion. The scene fits into that genre of Christian 
literature that details the suffering and torments of Jesus. It is a scene that 
is constantly evoked by readers of Andric as one of the most memorable 
. . .in all of Andric's writings" (1996a, 132). But while a crucifixion 
image does arise from what Sells chastely refers to as the "long, anatom- 
ically detailed account," the reader's experience of this scene greatly ex- 
ceeds the terms of Sells's description. As Matthias says, "one feels the 
shaft in one's own entrails" (1987, 15). 
84 I Boose 
In Andric's novel, the Turks first order the whole male population to 
witness the execution. As the men arrive, the first objects they see, lying 
ominously on the scaffold, are the instruments of impalement: 
an oak stake about eight feet long, pointed . . . and tipped with 
iron and . .. well greased with lard [and the peasant, who lay] as 
. . . ordered, face downward. The gipsies [the designated impalers] 
approached and . .. bound his hands behind his back[,] then . . . 
attached a cord to each of his . . . ankles. . . . They pulled the 
cords outwards and to the side, stretching his legs wide apart. Mean- 
while Merdjan [the senior gipsy] placed the stake on two small 
wooden chocks so that it pointed between the peasant's legs. Then 
he took from his belt a . . . knife, knelt beside the stretched-out 
man ... to cut away his trousers and widen the opening through 
which the stake would enter his body.... As soon as he had fin- 
ished, [Merdjan] leapt up, took the wooden mallet and with slow 
measured blows began to strike the lower blunt end of the stake. 
Between each two blows he would stop . . . and look first at the 
body that the stake was penetrating and then at the two gipsies, 
reminding them to pull slowly and evenly. The body of the peasant, 
spreadeagled, writhed convulsively; at each blow of the mallet his 
spine twisted and bent, but the cords pulled and kept it straight. 
. . .Those nearest could hear . . . [the] sound that the stretched 
and twisted body emitted[,] a sort of ... cracking like a fence that 
is breaking down or a tree being felled. At every second blow the 
gipsy went over to the stretched-out body and leant over it to see 
whether the stake was going in the right direction and . .. that it 
had not touched any of the more important internal organs .... 
[Then,] for a moment the hammering ceased. Merdjan now saw 
that close to the right shoulder muscles the skin was stretched and 
swollen. He went forward quickly and cut the swollen place with 
two crossed cuts. . . . Two or three more blows, . . . and the iron- 
shod point of the stake began to break through at the place where 
he had cut. He struck a few more times until the point of the stake 
reached level with the right ear. The man was impaled on the stake 
as a lamb on the spit, only that the tip did not come through the 
mouth but in the back and had not seriously damaged the intestines, 
the heart or the lungs. Then Merdjan threw down the mallet and 
came nearer, . . . avoiding the blood which poured out . .. where 
the stake had entered and come out again. . .. The two gipsies 
turned the stiffened body on its back, . .. [bound] the legs to the 
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foot of the stake, . . . and began to lift him up like a sheep on a 
spit, [fixing and buttressing the stake] to a beam on the staging. 
. .On that open space[,] raised a full eight feet upright, stiff and 
bare to the waist, the man on the stake remained alone.... [The 
crowd of watchers] looked dumbly at this human likeness, up there 
in space, unnaturally stiff and upright. Fear chilled their entrails and 
their legs threatened to give way beneath them. ... [The peasant] 
was alive and conscious. His ribs rose and fell, the veins in his neck 
pulsed and his eyes kept turning slowly but unceasingly. Through 
the clenched teeth came a long drawn-out groaning in which a few 
words could be distinguished. "Turks, Turks . .." moaned the man 
on the stake. "Turks on the bridge . .. may you die like dogs . 
like dogs." (Andric [1945] 1959, 46-51) 
Within this agonizing description, there is, as Sells notes, a crucifixion 
image, but there is surely much more. For what the male population of 
Visegrad as well as Andric's readers have been compelled to witness is a 
four-hour rape scene in which the rebel against Turkish rule is literally 
skewered by the Turkish phallic emblem of power and then hoisted up 
in the feminized image of the penetrated body, the enormous Turkish 
phallus fixing in place the unforgettable picture of a grotesque and horrific 
sodomy. 
That impalement is always refigured in Serb cultural memory as a rape 
by the Turk and the implications the issue has for the 1990s Balkan wars 
become even clearer through a 1985 incident in Kosovo, the so-called 
Martinovic case, which, except for the high seriousness with which it was 
invested in Serbia, might more aptly have been dismissed as low comedy. 
A Serb farmer named Djordje Martinovic was found in a Kosovo field 
with a bottle up his backside. Initially, when discovered in this indelicate 
situation, Martinovic claimed that he had been accosted by three masked 
men armed with a syringe of morphine who sedated him, placed the bottle 
on a stick, and sodomized him with it. When taken to the hospital, how- 
ever, Martinovic admitted that there were no assailants and that he had 
been his own sodomizer. By then, however, the incident had been seized 
on by political nationalists, and Belgrade newspapers loudly accused the 
doctors of trying to deny the history of Serb suffering by repressing the 
real truth-that Martinovic had been attacked by Albanians who had then 
thrust the bottle up his anus. Croatian media, from the vantage of at least 
some cultural as well as geographical distance, treated the incident com- 
ically, speculating that Martinovic had been masturbating and the bottle 
had slipped, or had jumped off a tree and landed on the bottle, and so 
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forth (Ugresic 1998, 71). But in Serbia, the Martinovic case prompted 
sufficient outrage for Slobodan Milosevic to use it as the foundation on 
which to build a mountain of fictitious allegations about Kosovar Albanian 
acts of "genocide" against the Serbs. These allegations-made believable 
by the Martinovic incident-in turn led to a petition submitted by Bel- 
grade intellectuals to the assemblies of Serbia and Yugoslavia in January 
1986 calling for the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy ("Documents, Pe- 
tition to the Assembly" 1986). The petition, which asserted that "the case 
of Djordje Martinovic has come to symbolize the predicament of all Serbs 
in Kosovo," ultimately gave Milosevic the green light for his crucial de- 
cision to terminate the autonomous status that Kosovo had enjoyed under 
the Yugoslav federation since 1974.17 In connecting the beginning of the 
Yugoslav wars with the Martinovic incident, Croatian writer Dubravka 
Ugresic points with dark humor to the absurdity of that connection: "The 
war on the territory of Yugoslavia began several years ago," says Ugresic, 
"with the posterior of a completely innocent Serbian peasant" (1998, 71). 
But what could be treated with irony by a Slav living in Zagreb was, to 
Slavs in Belgrade, powerfully and collectively reminiscent of the most 
extreme form of humiliation. As Slaven Letica puts it, "Impalement by a 
beer bottle" became "a metaphor for five centuries . . . of Turkish acts 
of impalement [and the] mythology regarding the horrors of Turkish op- 
pression" (1996, 95). 
Important to my point is the language with which the Martinovic story 
was carried throughout Serbia and the way it took on a life of its own, 
continuing to appear in newspapers as much as six years later, repeatedly 
shifting the focus of conflict back five hundred years from the contem- 
porary Serb-Albanian dispute in Kosovo to the still-remembered outrage 
of imagined impalement by the Turks. In the crucial document produced 
in 1986 by the leading Serbian intellectual institution, The Memorandum 
of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the story of Martinovic and 
17 The January 21, 1986, petition, which also charged the Yugoslav authorities with at- 
tempting to calm the public by covering up the incident, is reprinted in the South Slav Journal 
and quoted in Mertus 1999 (108-9). For a detailed presentation of the legal documents and 
wranglings that surrounded the case, the extensive public attention it received, and the way it 
became a turning point for the fate of the whole of former Yugoslavia, see the chapter that 
Mertus devotes to this case, "Impaled with a Bottle" (1999, 98-121). In addition to its primary 
function of illustrating the fiction that Serbs in Kosovo were living under Albanian victimization, 
"the Martinovic case was singled out because the incident propelled the nationalist agenda 
brewing in the mid-1980s. ... The mere utterance of the name 'Djordje Martinovic' was 
enough to disprove the official notion [residual from the Tito days] of national harmony... 
The press after Martinovic trumpeted national conflict" (107). 
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his beer bottle is inflated into a narrative "reminiscent of the darkest days 
of the Turkish practice of impalement."18 Three years later the anxieties 
of the case had not diminished, and in a February 1989 edition of the 
popular weekly magazine Nin, Zivorad Mihajlovic (who proceeded to 
write a whole book on the case) once again found an immediate equation 
with Turkish impalement: "Here, we are dealing with the remains of the 
Ottoman Empire, in the use of a stake, but this time one wrapped in a 
bottle. In the time of the Turks, Serbs were also fixed to stakes, but even 
then the Turks used their servants-the Albanians" (quoted in Cohen 
1998, 149; and Mertus 1999, 109, 119).19 And in January 1991, only a 
year before the Serb army would invade Bosnia and turn its weapons 
against the imagined "Turks" with a violence not seen in Europe in fifty 
years, the Martinovic case still captured such headlines as "Crime Like in 
the Time of Turks" in Politika Ekspres ( ee Mertus 1999, 109, 119). Roger 
Cohen comes close to recognizing what I see about this incident and its 
connection to a specific, historically remembered trauma: "Thus an in- 
cident in which nobody was killed was used by Milosevic's media to awaken 
the darkest specters in the Serbian psyche .. . [and] this humiliation of 
a single Serb in a Kosovo field became synonymous with five centuries of 
Turkish oppression, impalement and genocide. . . . Listening to those 
gunners above Sarajevo, it was clear enough that the Martinovic model 
had been reapplied in Bosnia. All the specters of past Serb suffering had 
been deliberately raised and exaggerated here in Bosnia to justify a war 
in which the Serbs, consciously or unconsciously, used precisely the meth- 
ods of their past torturers" (1998, 150). 
If the Martinovic case needed further authority, it more than received 
it from the important Serb artist, Mica Popovic. Popovic's painting (fig. 
18 Kosta Mihailovic and Vasilije Krestic (1995) include a reprint of the entire 1986 memo, 
and this quotation from it falls on their page 129. See also Cohen 1998, 149; Mertus 1999, 
109, 119. 
19 It is worth noting the way that the Nin writer's hatred of the Albanian Kosovars here 
seems to make him misremember the scene in Andric's novel that he implicitly invokes. In 
Andric, the impaler-the "servant" to Turkish orders-is not an Albanian but a gypsy. In 
the Balkans' standoff between Serb and Turk or Serb and Albanian, the gypsies (Roma) have 
always occupied an unenviable position in the middle. In Andric's novel, they serve the Turks 
and help to torture the Serbs. During the 1999 expulsion ofAlbanians, the gypsies remained 
in Kosovo, where, again in compliance with the group in power, they aided the Serbs in the 
expulsion. Subsequently, however, NATO bombing changed the power equation. As Alba- 
nian Kosovars returned to their homes from exile and Serb civilians began fleeing north with 
the Roma close behind, the Roma found themselves turned back at the border to Serbia, 
denied entry as undesirable others, and forced to remain in Kosovo to face the wrath of the 
returnees. 
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Figure 1 Mica Popovic, May 1, 1985 
1), which purports by its title, May 1, 1985, to illustrate the real truth of 
what had happened in that Kosovo field, went on display in a prominent 
Belgrade gallery and was seen by well over a million people.20 They came 
by busloads and stood in lines to be enraged by its spectacular fusion of 
Christ's suffering and Djordje Martinovic's mythologized impalement on 
a beer bottle. In the iconography of Popovic's painting, the beer bottle 
20 This reproduction of the Popovic painting appears in Samardzic et al. 1990, 319. 
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rests beneath the cross while malevolent figures wearing traditional Al- 
banian headgear substitute for the Roman soldiers lowering Christ from 
the cross and a Yugoslav soldier in a uniform of the Tito era presides over 
the event, holding in his hands a nightstick that, given the particulars of 
the Martinovic story, suggestively implicates the communist regime in the 
crime of Serb victimization. 
The image thus condemns not only the Albanians but a sitting Yugoslav 
government depicted as protecting its ethnic minorities at the expense of 
the victimized Serbs-a government that badly needs to be replaced with 
the kind of state that Milosevic implicitly promised in his infamous 1989 
speech in Kosovo, where he stoked the growing anti-Albanian nationalism 
with his promise (and its implicit reference to the Martinovic incident) 
that Serbs "will never be beaten again." Through Popovic's painting, the 
Martinovic incident was framed within the same Christoslavic model of 
religiously fervid suffering that underlies the Serbs' core version of their 
history: Djordje Martinovic, whose trials add new material to the defining 
national narrative of Serb victimhood and reaffirm Serb claims to the 
highly contested territory of Kosovo, now apparently joins Prince Lazar 
as a type of Christ, the spear in the side replaced by the bottle up the 
backside, and Martinovic's agony now justifying revenge and conferring 
mystical beatitude on the Serb atrocities of both the Bosnian and the 
Kosovar wars. 
Rape as imagined reciprocity 
The invocation by Bosnian Serb leaders of the historicity of impalement 
as rationale for the contemporary killing of Muslims and the way the 
Martinovic case recalled that same narrative offer strong hints of the dark 
specters of cultural memory lying behind some of the least explicable and 
most brutal aspects of Serb aggression in Bosnia. This narrative of recip- 
rocal revenge for a mythologized impalement is likewise what explains the 
peculiar defacement in Ron Haviv's striking photograph of a portrait of 
a Bosnian Muslim family. Having fled Sarajevo before the siege was fully 
in place, the family returned to their home in 1996 to find that occupying 
Serb militia had taken every stick of furniture, windowpane, baseboard, 
and piece of electrical wiring. Only one item remained, a defaced pho- 
tograph. With a sharp instrument the Serbs had scraped away the faces 
of all four family members. Still not satisfied, they marked the photo with 
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yet another act of violence-four carefully placed slash marks that deftly 
impale each of the four figures (fig. 2).21 
Within Serbian culture, the excessively invested image of male rape/ 
impalement evokes an overdetermined memory of historical subjugation 
and an enraged sense of masculine humiliation that together suggest why 
the patterns of violence in this war were so especially those of rape and 
genital mutilation. In a particularly infamous incident from Omarska that 
came to trial at the Hague but ended in acquittal because the witness 
became too terrified to testify, Serb guards forced two Muslim prisoners 
to hold a third man upright in the position of the crucified Christ while 
a fourth prisoner was made to bite off his testicles (Vranic 1996, 292).22 
Even the obsessive pursuit of a "greater Serbia" that has driven Serb 
national policy for centuries suggests phallic insecurities, and these same 
anxieties resonate in the words of the Serb national anthem and the pe- 
culiar way that song played its own part in the Serbian genocidal script. 
As Muslim men in captured villages were lined up with their hands over 
their heads, awaiting probable execution, they were made to sing the Serb 
anthem, which opens with the defiant assertion: "[He] lies who says that 
Serbia is small." In a vivid acting out of the castration of Muslim culture, 
the Serb army rampaged through Bosnia, decapitating Muslim minarets 
and mosques, and, through such visual castrations, compelled the enemy 
Muslims psychologically to feel-and daily to observe signs of-their own 
impotence.23 
Given the determining power of the impalement myth and the way it 
encodes the Turkish conqueror's rape of Serbian masculinity, it might 
seem that rape of the enemy male rather than female would more logically 
accomplish reciprocity. Indeed, testimonial evidence suggests that, in ad- 
dition to genital mutilation, the rape of Muslim men may also have been 
frequent. In a relatively small sample of interviews conducted in refugee 
camps over a few months, Montenegrin journalist Seada Vranic found six 
men willing to admit that they had been raped, and she suspected that 
21 This photograph of the portrait appears as the final picture in the main text of Haviv's 
powerful collection of Bosnian and Kosovar war photographs (2000, 175). 
22 According to Vranic, variously horrific forms of castration were a favorite form of camp 
torture, virtually all of them ending in death. 
23 In connection with the interethnic conflict on Cyprus during the 1960s, when Greek 
Cypriots exploded dynamite in the minarets of Turkish towns, Vamik Volkan notes that "the 
damage was inescapably suggestive of castration: with the top gone the minaret looked like 
a big phallus with the top removed. It made a symbolic focal point for the narcissistic hurts 
of the Turks, who had largely unconsciously felt that their phallic aggression and drive for 
success had been circumvented" (1988, 128). 
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Figure 2 Ron Haviv, from Blood and Honey: A Balkan War Journal (Haviv 2000, 175). 
Reprinted by permission of VII Photo Limited, Paris. 
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the numbers were actually higher (1996, 292).24 But even within the 
reports of male rape, there is a pattern that suggests that the more psy- 
chologically satisfying form of Serb revenge was not the direct, unmediated 
one but one that was buffered by symbolic structures and displaced into 
an elaborated triangulation. Vranic's transcription of the testimony of a 
man called Faruk is, in this regard, illuminating. 
After a group of Serb irregulars arrived at Faruk's farm, the senior one 
sent the others off on a fictitious errand and then forced Faruk into the 
cowshed, where he raped him, mocking him as he did, "What happened 
Turk? You're deflowered?" Again, the Turk. Of the six male rapes that 
Vranic cites, this was one of five done in secret (1996, 292). Especially 
inside a world where brutality was strongly applauded, the fact that five 
of the six rapists wanted to keep their actions secret from their peers argues 
for a culture that reads homosexual penetration-even if enacted within 
the macho display of rape-as degradingly effeminizing for both partic- 
ipants, and the impetus for secretly raping other males within these norms 
would seem weighted toward guilty desire rather than cultural vengeance. 
For Faruk's rapist, the enactment of triumphal revenge and the violent 
display of cultural dominance came later that night within a collective 
performance of male bonding enacted through rape but reconstructed 
within a symbolic displacement. 
Initially, the Serb soldiers tried to humiliate Faruk by forcing him to 
sexually penetrate a sheep. Beaten unconscious for refusing, Faruk was 
awakened later that night by the excruciating pain of an iron pole being 
pushed into his backside, again by the senior soldier. This time, the sexual 
violence was formulated as a group act involving all ten Serb soldiers' 
pinning him to the ground and collectively jeering, "Turk." In this re- 
enacted impalement/rape, not only was the category of private/collective 
reversed, but the underlying male-male dynamic, no longer unmediated, 
was, through the pole, displaced to the symbolic. Likewise in the detention 
24 While rape of male prisoners in war is something that we can assume occurs, it is a 
subject cloaked in a powerful silence. According to a footnote in Campbell 1998, "accounts 
can be found in 'Thousands of Men Raped in Bosnia: A Taboo on War Reporting,' abridged 
translation from Le Nouveau Quotidien 10-12 March 1995, in BosNews (Digest 211), 13 
March 1995; and in a Reuters report in Tribunal Watch, 3 July 1996" (274, n. 116). Female 
rape, on the other hand, seems to be an issue of inexhaustible interest, especially to the 
military and the media. During the Gulf War, the American print media energetically engaged 
in salacious speculation over whether any of the American women pilots held as POWs by 
Iraqi troops had been raped. Yet while women POWs were decidedly fewer than their male 
counterparts, the possibility that any of America's fighting sons might have been similarly 
abused was never so much as hinted at. 
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camps, while some Muslim men were no doubt raped by their guards, 
the favored sexual performance of dominance and humiliation was one 
that again removed the Serb aggressor from the ambivalent site of ho- 
mosexual desire. Instead of physically performing the role of rapist them- 
selves, Serbs forced Muslim males to rape other Muslim men in shows in 
which "camp guards compel[led] inmates to engage in sexual acts with 
each other. It was the favourite form of entertainment of the camp staff 
in Manjaca and the commander of the camp, along with his staff, seldom 
failed to attend these performances" (Vranic 1996, 292). Not only was 
the rape victim's degradation enhanced by turning rape into a public 
performance where the victim was mocked by jeering spectators, but the 
camaraderie among the Serb spectators was enhanced by the power they 
enjoyed as collective voyeurs. For the Serbs, the strategy would yield two 
benefits: it would both strengthen their own bonds and vitiate the bonds 
among the Muslim men by forcing them to become not merely victims 
of the Serbs but also victims and victimizers of one another. 
Since rape occurs in all wars, it is a universal and, by inference, must 
be viewed as such. Yet according to general consensus, rape during the 
Bosnian war exceeded any normalized model and thus cannot really be 
explained by it. What I have argued is that Serb rape of Bosniak women 
should be theorized within a culture-specific explanation and recognized 
as a projection that has its origins inside of the powerfully invested nar- 
ratives of Serb cultural memory. And what I have also argued is that within 
that storehouse lies the humiliating memory of rape by the Turk. Like 
both of the collective and triangulated displacements above, the wide- 
spread rape of "Turk" women in this war should also be understood as 
a displacement of the unmediated vengeance of male-male rape. Translated 
by these terms, crossing the Drina to create rape camps and subject 
Bosnia's Muslim women en masse to the authority of the Serb phallus 
not only enacts a repetition and a return to subjugate the omnipresent 
Turk but tries to reciprocate the humiliating violation of male impale- 
ment/rape inside of a revised and improved script. Moreover, despite its 
substitution of the targeted victim, it works as commensurate reciproca- 
tion, and it works precisely because, in constructing women's bodies as 
property signifying the honor of the male community, patriarchal culture 
has produced the equation that makes this substitution possible. Through 
the tactical deployment of rape, Serb aggressions during the Yugoslav wars 
made visible a bitter irony inherent in the relationship among rape, pa- 
triarchy, and the vulnerability of a culture to the devastation of its identity: 
the more patriarchal the culture, the more vulnerable it becomes, because 
94 1 Boose 
all the more likely are the women within it to become targets for enemy 
rape. 
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